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In this paper, we construct a class of 2k-variable Boolean functions which have optimal
algebraic degree, very high nonlinearity, optimal algebraic immunity, and are 1-resilient.
These properties are unconditional except the algebraic immunity property, which is
optimal under someunproven assumptions. However, since the assumptions are verified to
be true for k ≤ 29, so these functions have optimal algebraic immunity at least for k ≤ 29.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In many symmetric cryptosystems, Boolean functions are critical building blocks. To resist known attacks, there have
beenmany criteria for designing Boolean functions. Generally speaking, before 2003, cryptographic Boolean functions were
usually required to be balanced, have high algebraic degree and high nonlinearity. The concept of correlation immunity was
proposed by Siegenthaler [25], then Xiao and Massey [28] gave a simple spectral characterization. Many papers discussed
functions with high nonlinearity and high-order correlation immunity, and there have beenmany constructions [2,7,13,21],
but many of which are Maiorana–McFarland like functions. When n is small, some resilient functions with maximal
nonlinearity have been obtained [18,22,24]. Since 2003, the algebraic attacks proposed by Courtois and Meier [1,8,9,19]
have received the world’s attention, as a result, the algebraic immunity of Boolean functions has been introduced, and the
study of annihilators of Boolean functions becomes important.
Definition 1.1 ([19]). The algebraic immunity AIn(f ) of an n-variable Boolean function is defined to be the lowest degree of
nonzero functions g such that fg = 0 or (f + 1)g = 0.
To resist standard algebraic attacks, cryptographic Boolean functions should have high algebraic immunity. Up to now,
several classes of Boolean functions which are achieving the optimal algebraic immunity have been proposed in [4,6,11,
15,16,20]. Designing Boolean functions to meet all relevant criteria has been proved to be a really hard challenge. All the
above constructions that attain the optimum algebraic immunity order are not suitable for cryptographic applications due
to unsatisfactory values of other cryptographic criteria. In 2008, Carlet and Feng made a breakthrough at this point, they
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constructed in [5] an infinite class of n-variable Boolean functions with optimal algebraic immunity, maximal algebraic
degree and high nonlinearity. It was the first class of functions whichmeet most of the cryptographic criteria. Very recently,
Tu andDeng proposed in [26] a class of algebraic immunity optimal functions of even number variables under an assumption
of a combinatoric conjecture, the nonlinearity of these functions were even better than the functions proposed in [5].
Although Carlet proved in [3] that the functions in [26] were weak against fast algebraic attacks, he could repair this
weakness through small modifications. However, among all themain designing criteria of Boolean functions, the correlation
immunity or resiliency was ignored in [5,26] and in all other designing methods of functions with optimal algebraic
immunity.
In this paper, we propose an infinite class of 2k-variable Boolean functions, which satisfy all the main cryptographic
criteria: 1-resilient, algebraic degree optimal, and very high nonlinearity. Based on the conjecture proposed in [26], it can be
proved that the algebraic immunity of our functions is at least suboptimal. Moreover, when k is odd, the algebraic immunity
is actually optimal, and for even k, we find that the algebraic immunity is optimal at least for k ≤ 29.
We do not consider the resistance to fast algebraic attack [8] of our functions in this paper. Maybe these functions are also
weak against fast algebraic attacks. In fact, the construction of functions that in addition provide a good resistance to fast
algebraic attacks (thus completely optimized functions) is quite a hard challenge. However, to the best of our knowledge,
this is the first instance of resilient functions satisfying most of the cryptographic criteria.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give some useful definitions and tools used later in the
paper. In Section 3, we discuss our construction methods of functions, as well as their cryptographic properties. We give
conclusions in Section 4.
2. Preliminaries
Let n be a positive integer. A Boolean function on n variables is a mapping from Fn2 into F2, which is the finite field with
two elements. We denote by Bn the set of all n-variable Boolean functions.
Every Boolean function f in Bn has a unique representation as a multivariate polynomial over F2
f (x1, x2, . . . , xn) =

I⊆{1,...,n}
aI

i∈I
xi,
where aI ’s are in F2, such kind of representation is called the algebraic normal form (ANF). The algebraic degree deg(f ) of f
is defined to be the maximum degree of those monomials with nonzero coefficients in its algebraic normal form. A Boolean
function f is called affine if deg(f ) ≤ 1, we denote by An the set of all affine functions in Bn. The support of f is defined as
supp(f ) = {x ∈ Fn2 : f (x) = 1}, andwt(f ) is the number of vectors which lie in supp(f ). For two functions f and g in Bn, the
Hamming distance d(f , g) between f and g is defined aswt(f + g). The nonlinearity nl(f ) of a Boolean function f is defined
as the minimum Hamming distance between f and all affine functions, i.e. nl(f ) = Ming∈And(f , g).
For any a ∈ Fn2, the value
Wf (a) =

x∈Fn2
(−1)f (x)+⟨x,a⟩
is called theWalsh spectrum of f at a, where ⟨x, a⟩ denotes the inner product between x and a, i.e. ⟨x, a⟩ = x1a1+· · ·+xnan.
If Wf (a) = 0 for 1 ≤ wt(a) ≤ m, then f is called m-th order correlation immune, this is the famous Xiao–Massey [28]
characterization of correlation immune functions. Moreover, if f is also balanced, we call f is m-th order resilient. The
nonlinearity of a Boolean function f can be expressed via its Walsh spectra by the next formula
nl(f ) = 2n−1 − 1
2
max
a∈Fn2
|Wf (a)|.
Notice that for f : F2n −→ F2, the Walsh spectrum of f at a ∈ F2n is defined by
Wf (a) =

x∈F2n
(−1)f (x)+tr(a·x),
where the trace function tr is a mapping from F2n onto F2 given by tr(x) = n−1i=0 x2i . For f : F2k × F2k −→ F2, the Walsh
spectrum of f at (a, b) ∈ F2k × F2k is defined by
Wf (a, b) =

(x,y)∈F2k×F2k
(−1)f (x,y)+tr(a·x+b·y),
where tr is the trace function from F2k onto F2. It is well-known that the nonlinearity satisfies the following inequality
nl(f ) ≤ 2n−1 − 2 n2−1.
When n is even, the above upper bound can be attained, and such Boolean functions are called bent [23]. Bent function has
several equivalent definitions, for instance, a function f is bent is equivalent to say that supp(f ) is a (2n, 2n−1±2 n2−1, 2n−2±
2
n
2−1)-difference set in the additive group of Fn2.
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3. The construction method and cryptographic properties
In this section,we give our construction inspired byDillon’s partial spread function [12] anddiscuss itsmain cryptographic
properties. First, we recall Dillon’s functions.
Dillon’s Construction ([12]). Let n = 2k, F2n ≈ F2k × F2k , g : F2k −→ F2 is a balanced function which vanishes at 0, define
f : F2k × F2k → F2 by
f (x, y) = g(xy2k−2)
then f is bent.
In the following construction, we try to consider functions’ resiliency property in addition to algebraic degree,
nonlinearity and algebraic immunity.
Construction 3.1. Let n = 2k, k ≥ 3 and F2k be the finite field with 2k elements, α be a primitive element of F2k . Set
A = {0, 1, α, α2, . . . , α2k−1−1}. We define an n-variable Boolean function f : F2k × F2k → F2, whose support supp(f ) is
constituted by the following four disjoint parts:
• {(x, y) : y = αix, x ∈ F∗
2k
, i = 1, 2, . . . , 2k−1 − 1}
• {(x, y) : y = x, x ∈ A}
• {(x, 0) : x ∈ F2k \ A}• {(0, y) : y ∈ F2k \ A}.
3.1. 1-resiliency, algebraic degree and nonlinearity
Proposition 3.2. Let function f be defined as in Construction 3.1; then f is 1-resilient.
Proof. Since wt(f ) = (2k − 1)(2k−1 − 1) + (2k−1 + 1) + (2k−1 − 1) + (2k−1 − 1) = 2n−1, so f is balanced. We need to
verify thatWf (a, b) = 0 for each (a, b) ∈ F2k × F2k satisfying wt(a, b) = 1. In fact, we can prove more. When a, b are not
all zero, first note that
(x,y)∈F2k×F2k
(−1)tr(ax+by) =

x∈F2k
(−1)tr(ax) ·

y∈F2k
(−1)tr(by) = 0,
where tr is the trace function from F2k onto F2. Then we have
Wf (a, b) =

(x,y)∈F2k
(−1)f (x,y)+tr(ax+by)
= −2

(x,y)∈supp(f )
(−1)tr(ax+by).
We can see
(x,y)∈supp(f )
(−1)tr(ax+by) =
2k−1−1
i=1

x∈F∗
2k
(−1)tr((a+bαi)x) +

x∈A
(−1)tr((a+b)x) +

x∈F2k \A
(−1)tr(ax) +

y∈F2k \A
(−1)tr(by).
We consider the Walsh spectra at two kinds of points:
1. a ≠ 0, b = 0, then
(x,y)∈supp(f )
(−1)tr(ax+by) = 1− 2k−1 + 2k − |A| +

x∈F2k \A
(−1)tr(ax) +

x∈A
(−1)tr(ax);
2. b ≠ 0, a = 0, then
(x,y)∈supp(f )
(−1)tr(ax+by) = 1− 2k−1 + 2k − |A| +

y∈F2k \A
(−1)tr(by) +

y∈A
(−1)tr(by).
Combining with the equality |A| = 2k−1 + 1, it is obvious to see thatWf (a, b) = 0 for ab = 0. Therefore f is 1-resilient. 
From Siegenthaler’s inequality[25], we know that for an n-variable,m-th order resilient Boolean function g , it should be
satisfied thatm+ deg(g) ≤ n− 1. We will see that f in Construction 3.1 is algebraic degree optimal in this sense.
Proposition 3.3. Let function f be defined as in Construction 3.1; then deg(f ) = n− 2.
Proof. Let g, h : F2k × F2k → F2 be two Boolean functions as defined by supp(g) = {(x, y) : y = αix, x ∈ F∗2k , i =
0, 1, . . . , 2k−1 − 1} and by supp(h) = {(0, 0)} ∪ {(x, x) : x ∈ F2k \ A} ∪ {(x, 0) : x ∈ F2k \ A} ∪ {(0, y) : y ∈ F2k \ A}. So
f = g + h. Since g is a function in the PS− class, it is a bent function, we know that deg(g) ≤ k < n− 2 from [23]. To prove
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deg(f ) = n− 2, we only need to prove deg(h) = n− 2. By Lagrange’s interpolation formula, we have
h(x, y) = (x2k−1 + 1)(y2k−1 + 1)+

a∉A
((x+ a)2k−1 + 1)((y+ a)2k−1 + 1)
+

a∉A
((x+ a)2k−1 + 1)(y2k−1 + 1)+

a∉A
(x2
k−1 + 1)((y+ a)2k−1 + 1).
Expanding the terms, we have
h(x, y) =

a∉A
2k−1
i=1
2k−1
j=1

2k − 1
i

2k − 1
j

x2
k−1−iy2
k−1−jai+j.
It is easy to see deg(h) ≤ n− 2. The coefficient of x2k−1−1y2k−1−1 is

a∉A
a2 =

1+ α2k−1
1+ α
2
which is obviously nonzero in F2k . Therefore deg(h) = n− 2. 
Now we consider the nonlinearity of functions from Construction 3.1. We need a result in [5].
Proposition 3.4 ([5]). Let ω ∈ F∗2n be a primitive element and λ ∈ F2n , denote
Sλ =
2n−2
i=2n−1−1
(−1)tr(λωi).
If λ ≠ 0, then
|Sλ| ≤ 2 n2 n · ln 2+ 1.
Proposition 3.5. Let function f be defined as in Construction 3.1; then nl(f ) ≥ 2n−1 − 2k−1 − 3 · k · 2 k2 ln 2− 7.
Proof. From the above proof we only need to consider
K(a,b) =

(x,y)∈supp(f )
(−1)tr(ax+by)
for (a, b) ∈ F2k × F2k with a · b ≠ 0, and where tr is the trace function from F2k onto F2. We know that
K(a,b) =
2k−1−1
i=1

x∈F∗
2k
(−1)tr((a+bαi)x) +

x∈A
(−1)tr((a+b)x) +

x∈F2k \A
(−1)tr(ax) +

y∈F2k \A
(−1)tr(by).
By Proposition 3.4, we know that
x∉A
(−1)tr(ax)
 =

2k−2
i=2k−1
(−1)tr(aαi)

≤

2k−2
i=2k−1−1
(−1)tr(aαi)
+
(−1)tr(aα2k−1−1)
≤ (k · 2 k2 ln 2+ 1)+ 1 = k · 2 k2 ln 2+ 2.
Similarly, we have
y∉A
(−1)tr(by)
 ≤ k · 2 k2 ln 2+ 2.
If a+ b ≠ 0, we also have
x∈A
(−1)tr((a+b)x)
 =
−
x∉A
(−1)tr((a+b)x)
 ≤ k · 2 k2 ln 2+ 2.
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Table 1
The nonlinearity of functions in Construction 3.1.
n 2n−1 − 2 n2−1 nl(f )
6 28 24
8 120 112
10 496 484
12 2016 1996
14 8128 8100
16 32640 32588
18 130816 130760
Now we can obtain an upper bound for |K(a,b)| easily:
1. a+ b = 0, thenK(a,b) =
(2k−1 − 1)(−1)+ (2k−1 + 1)+
x∉A
(−1)tr(ax) +

y∉A
(−1)tr(by)

≤ 2+ 2 · (k · 2 k2 ln 2+ 2);
2. a+ bαi = 0 for some i, 0 < i < 2k−1, then
K(a,b) =
(2k − 1)+ (−1) · (2k−1 − 2)+

x∈A
(−1)tr((a+b)x) +

x∈F2k \A
(−1)tr(ax)
+

y∈F2k \A
(−1)tr(by)
 ≤ 2k−1 + 1+ 3 · (k · 2 k2 ln 2+ 2);
3. otherwiseK(a,b) =
−(2k−1 − 1)+

x∈A
(−1)tr((a+b)x) +

x∈F2k \A
(−1)tr(ax)
+

y∈F2k \A
(−1)tr(by)
 ≤ 2k−1 + 1+ 3 · (k · 2 k2 ln 2+ 2).
Finally, we get
nl(f ) = 2n−1 − 1
2
max
a,b∈F2k
|Wf (a, b)| = 2n−1 − max
a,b∈F∗
2k
|K(a, b)|
≥ 2n−1 − 2k−1 − 3 · k · 2 k2 ln 2− 7. 
In fact, we can improve this lower bound according to the method in [27]. We use Magma system to compute the
nonlinearity of f in Construction 3.1; see Table 1. We can see that the nonlinearity of f is very high and satisfying.
3.2. The algebraic immunity
In this section, we discuss the algebraic immunity property of Boolean functions from Construction 3.1. We first recall a
combinatorial conjecture proposed in [26].
Conjecture 3.6 ([26]). Assume k ∈ Z, k > 1. For every x ∈ Z, 0 ≤ x ≤ 2k − 1, we expand x as a binary string of length k, and
denote the number of one’s in the string byw(x). For any t ∈ Z, 0 < t < 2k − 1, let
St = {(a, b)|a, b ∈ Z, 0 ≤ a, b < 2k − 1, a+ b = t mod 2k − 1, w(a)+ w(b) ≤ k− 1}
then |St | ≤ 2k−1.
In fact, the authors designed in [26] an algorithm and validated their conjecture until k ≤ 29. As a cornerstone of the
algebraic immunity property of functions in [26], the conjecture has attracted researchers’ attention. The authors in [10,14]
tried to attack this problem theoretically and some advances had beenmade, and they verified that the conjecture is correct
for many cases of t . In the remainder of this paper, we always assume that this conjecture is correct.
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In the course of the proof, we need the knowledge of BCH code (see, for example, [17]). For the convenience of the reader,
we recall the definition of a BCH code.
Theorem 3.7 (The BCH Bound). Let Φ be a cyclic code of length n andwith generator polynomial g(x) such that for some integers
b ≥ 0, δ ≥ 1
g(αb) = g(αb+1) = · · · = g(αb+δ−2) = 0
i.e. the code has a string of δ − 1 consecutive powers of α as zeros, where α is a primitive n-th root of unity, then the minimal
distance of Φ is at least δ.
This induces the definition of a BCH code.
Definition 3.8. A cyclic code of length n over Fq is a BCH code of designed distance δ if, for some integer b ≥ 0,
g(x) = lcm{m(b)(x),m(b+1)(x), . . . ,m(b+δ−2)(x)}
i.e. g(x) is the lowest degree monic polynomial over Fq having αb, αb+1, . . . , αb+δ−2 as zeros, wherem(i)(x) is the minimal
polynomial of αi over Fq.
We will use the BCH bound repeatedly, for later convenience we introduce the following corollary:
Corollary 3.9. Let f (x) be a univariate polynomial over the finite field F2k with deg(f ) ≤ 2k−2, α be a primitive element of F2k .
If f (x) has δ − 1 consecutive roots αs, αs+1, . . . , αs+δ−2, in which s is a nonnegative integer, and if f is not the zero polynomial,
then the number of nonzero coefficients in f (x) is larger than or equal to δ.
Proof. Write f (x) = a0+a1x+· · ·+a2k−2x2k−2 with ai ∈ F2k . From the assumed condition, we know that (a0, a1, . . . , a2k−2)
is a codeword in some BCH code of length 2k − 1 over F2k , having αs, αs+1, . . . , αs+δ−2 as zeros and with designed distance
δ. According to the BCH bound, if this codeword is nonzero, then its weight should be larger than or equal to δ. 
First, we show that the algebraic immunity in Construction 3.1 is at least suboptimal. For this we need the following
lemma.
Lemma 3.10. For every 0 < t < 2k − 1, the modular equation a+ b = t mod 2k − 1, w(a)+ w(b) = k− 1 has at least one
pair of solution.
Proof. At first we observe that, if t and t ′ belong to a same cyclotomic coset mod 2k − 1, then the modular equations for t
and for t ′ have exactly the same number of solutions. Without loss of generality, we suppose that t has the following form:
t = 11 · · · 1  
n1
00 · · · 0  
n2
1 · · · 1  
n3
0 · · · 0  
n4
· · · 1 · · · 1  
n2r−1
0 · · · 0  
n2r
.
In order to prove the lemma, we only need to construct a pair of (a, b) to be a solution. If 0 ≤ a, b < 2k − 1 satisfy
a+ b = t mod 2k − 1, thenw(a)+w(b) = w(t)+ s, in which s represents the number of carries when doing the modular
addition. Sincew(t) = n1+ n3+ · · · + n2r−1 and k = n1+ n2+ · · · + n2r−1+ n2r , we have that (a, b) is a required solution
if and only if a+ b = t mod 2k − 1 and the number of carries is n2 + n4 + · · · + n2r − 1 when doing the modular addition.
If n2r > 1, we construct a pair (a, b) as follows:
a = 1 · · · 1  
n1−1
0 1 · · · 11  
n2
1 · · · 1  
n3−1
0 1 · · · 11  
n4
· · · 1 · · · 1  
n2r−1−1
0 1 · · · 110  
n2r
b = 0 · · · 0  
n1−1
0 0 · · · 01  
n2
0 · · · 0  
n3−1
0 0 · · · 01  
n4
· · · 0 · · · 0  
n2r−1−1
0 0 · · · 010  
n2r
.
If n2r = 1, we construct (a, b) as
a = 1 · · · 1  
n1−1
0 1 · · · 11  
n2
1 · · · 1  
n3−1
0 1 · · · 11  
n4
· · · 1 · · · 1  
n2r−1
0
b = 0 · · · 0  
n1−1
0 0 · · · 01  
n2
0 · · · 0  
n3−1
0 0 · · · 01  
n4
· · · 0 · · · 0  
n2r−1
0.
It is not difficult to verify that (a, b) is a required solution. 
Proposition 3.11. Assume Conjecture 3.6 is correct. Let n = 2k; then the algebraic immunity of function f in Construction 3.1 is
at least suboptimal, i.e. AIn(f ) ≥ k− 1.
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Proof. We need to prove that both f , f + 1 have no annihilators with degrees ≤ k − 2. Let h : F2k × F2k → F2 satisfy
deg(h) ≤ k− 2 and f · h = 0. We will prove h = 0. Observe that h can be written as a polynomial of two variables on F2k as
h(x, y) =
2k−1
i=0
2k−1
j=0
hi,jxiyj,
where hi,j ∈ F2k . By deg(h) ≤ k− 2, we have hi,j = 0 with w(i)+ w(j) ≥ k− 1. Since h(x, γ x) = 0 for x ∈ F∗2k , γ ∈ ∆ :=
{α, α2, . . . , α2k−1−1}. Write
h(x, γ x) =

i,j
hi,jxi(γ x)j = h0,0 +
2k−2
t=1
ht(γ )xt
in which
ht(γ ) =
2k−2
j=0
ht−j,jγ j.
We have h0,0 = 0, ht(γ ) = 0 for 1 ≤ t ≤ 2k − 2, γ ∈ ∆. Since ht has consecutive 2k−1 − 1 roots, by Corollary 3.9,
if ht is not the zero polynomial, then the number of nonzero coefficients of ht should be greater than or equal to 2k−1. Set
J = { j | j ∈ Z, 0 ≤ j ≤ 2k−2, w(t−j)+w(j) ≤ k−2}. However, by Conjecture 3.6 and Lemma 3.10, we have | J| ≤ 2k−1−1.
Hence ht = 0 for 1 ≤ t ≤ 2k − 2. So h = 0.
Since supp(f + 1) ⊇ {(x, αix) | x ∈ F∗
2k
, i = 2k−1, . . . , 2k − 2}, a similar argument is applicable to f + 1, and we can
show that f + 1 has no annihilator of degree≤ k− 2. Therefore AIn(f ) ≥ k− 1. 
In fact, we can analyze the algebraic immunity of the given functions in Construction 3.1 more accurately. We will
prove that the functions in Construction 3.1 have optimal algebraic immunity when k is odd under the assumption of the
correctness of Conjecture 3.6. For this we need the following lemma.
Lemma 3.12. With the notation of Conjecture 3.6. Assume Conjecture 3.6 is correct. Let k be an odd integer. If w(t) ≤ k−12 , then
|St | is strictly less than 2k−1.
Proof. The proof is straightforward. If (a, b) ∈ St , then obviously (b, a) ∈ St . Since
 t
2 ,
t
2

is a solution of St if and only if
w
 t
2
+ w  t2  = 2w(t) ≤ k− 1. Hence ifw(t) ≤ k−12 , then |St |must be odd, i.e. |St | is strictly less than 2k−1. 
Proposition 3.13. Assume Conjecture 3.6 is correct. Let n = 2k. If k is odd, then the algebraic immunity of the function f
in Construction 3.1 is optimal, i.e. AIn(f ) = k.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 3.11, we need to prove that both f , f +1 have no annihilatorswith degrees≤ k−1.
For the sake of completeness, we repeat appropriate parts of the proof of Proposition 3.11. Let h : F2k × F2k → F2 satisfy
deg(h) ≤ k− 1 and f · h = 0. We will prove h = 0. Write
h(x, y) =
2k−1
i=0
2k−1
j=0
hi,jxiyj,
where hi,j ∈ F2k . By deg(h) ≤ k − 1, we have hi,j = 0 when w(i) + w(j) ≥ k. Since h(x, γ x) = 0 for x ∈ F∗2k , γ ∈ ∆ :=
{α, α2, . . . , α2k−1−1}. Write
h(x, γ x) =

i,j
hi,jxi(γ x)j = h0,0 +
2k−2
t=1
ht(γ )xt
in which
ht(γ ) :=
2k−2
j=0
ht−j,jγ j.
We have h0,0 = 0, ht(γ ) = 0 for 1 ≤ t ≤ 2k − 2, γ ∈ ∆. Since ht has consecutive 2k−1 − 1 roots, by Corollary 3.9, if
ht is not the zero polynomial, then the number of nonzero coefficients of ht should be greater than or equal to 2k−1. Set
Jt = { j | j ∈ Z, 0 ≤ j ≤ 2k− 2, w(t − j)+w(j) ≤ k− 1}. Ifw(t) ≤ k−12 , by Lemma 3.12, we have | Jt | < 2k−1. Hence ht = 0
forw(t) ≤ k−12 . In particular, we have ht,0 = 0 forw(t) ≤ k−12 .
Since h(x, 0) = 0 for x ∈ F2k \ A = {α2k−1 , . . . , α2k−2}, i.e.
0 = h0,0 +
2k−2
i=1
hi,0xi := h0(x).
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By Corollary 3.9, if h0 is not the zero polynomial, then the number of nonzero coefficients of h0 should be greater than or
equal to 2k−1. Since the number of hi,0 for which 0 ≤ i ≤ 2k − 2 and w(i) ≤ k−12 is
(k−1)/2
j=0

k
j

= 2k−1, the number of
nonzero coefficients of h0 is ≤ 2k − 1− 2k−1 = 2k−1 − 1. So h0 = 0. Hence ht,0 = 0 for all 1 ≤ t ≤ 2k − 2. Therefore, the
number of nonzero coefficients of ht is≤ 2k−1 − 1. So ht = 0 for all 1 ≤ t ≤ 2k − 2. We have h = 0.
Since
supp(f + 1) ⊇ {(x, αix) | x ∈ F∗2k , i = 2k−1, . . . , 2k − 2}

{(x, 0) | x = 1, α, . . . , α2k−1−1},
a similar argument is applicable to f + 1, and we can show that f + 1 has no annihilator of degree ≤ k − 1. Therefore
AIn(f ) = k. 
For the case of even k, the actual computation by Magma system shows that the functions in Construction 3.1 have
optimal algebraic immunity for small k. To deal with this case, we first make some assumption related to Conjecture 3.6.
Assumption A. With the notation of Conjecture 3.6. Set T = {t | 1 ≤ t ≤ 2k − 2, |St | = 2k−1}. Then |T | < 2k−1.
Remark 3.14. By Lemma 3.12, if Conjecture 3.6 is correct, then Assumption A is also true for odd k. For even k, we use the
algorithm for validating Conjecture 3.6 in [26] to verify that Assumption A is true for all even k ≤ 29.
Proposition 3.15. Assume both Conjecture3.6 andAssumptionA are correct. Let n = 2k. If k is even, then the algebraic immunity
of the function f in Construction 3.1 is optimal, i.e. AIn(f ) = k.
Proof. Similarly, we need to prove that both f , f +1 have no annihilatorswith degrees≤ k−1. For the sake of completeness,
we repeat appropriate parts of the proof of Proposition 3.11. Let h : F2k × F2k → F2 satisfy deg(h) ≤ k − 1 and f · h = 0.
We will prove h = 0. Write
h(x, y) =
2k−1
i=0
2k−1
j=0
hi,jxiyj,
where hi,j ∈ F2k . By deg(h) ≤ k − 1, we have hi,j = 0 when w(i) + w(j) ≥ k. Since h(x, γ x) = 0 for x ∈ F∗2k , γ ∈ ∆ :=
{α, α2, . . . , α2k−1−1}. Write
h(x, γ x) =

i,j
hi,jxi(γ x)j = h0,0 +
2k−2
t=1
ht(γ )xt
in which
ht(γ ) :=
2k−2
j=0
ht−j,jγ j.
We have h0,0 = 0, ht(γ ) = 0 for 1 ≤ t ≤ 2k − 2, γ ∈ ∆. Since ht has consecutive 2k−1 − 1 roots, by Corollary 3.9, if ht is
not the zero polynomial, then the number of nonzero coefficients of ht should be greater than or equal to 2k−1.
Since h(x, x) = 0 for x ∈ {α, α2, . . . , α2k−1−1}, and h(x, x) = h0,0 +2k−2t=1 atxt , where at :=i+j≡t hi,j =2k−2i=0 hi,t−i,
we have
2k−2
t=1 atxt = 0 for x ∈ {α, α2, . . . , α2k−1−1}. Set T1 = {t | 1 ≤ t ≤ 2k − 2, |St | < 2k−1} and T2 = {t | 1 ≤ t ≤
2k − 2, |St | = 2k−1}. By Assumption A, we have |T2| < 2k−1. Hence |T1| = 2k − 1 − |T2| > 2k−1 − 1, i.e. |T1| ≥ 2k−1. For
t ∈ T1, since |St | < 2k−1, we have ht = 0, hence at = 0. So the number of nonzero at(1 ≤ t ≤ 2k − 2) is at most 2k−1 − 1.
By Corollary 3.9, we have at = 0 for all 1 ≤ t ≤ 2k−2. Thus, since ht(1) = at , we have ht(γ ) = 0 for all 1 ≤ t ≤ 2k−2 and
for γ ∈ {1, α, α2, . . . , α2k−1−1}. By Conjecture 3.6 and Corollary 3.9, we have ht = 0 for all 1 ≤ t ≤ 2k − 2, hence h = 0.
Since
supp(f + 1) ⊇ {(x, αix) | x ∈ F∗2k , i = 2k−1, . . . , 2k − 2}

{(x, x) | x = α2k−1 , . . . , α2k−2},
a similar argument is applicable to f + 1, and we can show that f + 1 has no annihilator of degree ≤ k − 1. Therefore
AIn(f ) = k. 
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we construct an infinite class of 2k-variable Boolean functions, which optimizes most of the cryptographic
criteria for designing Boolean functions: 1-resilient, algebraic degree optimal, and very high nonlinearity. Based on the
conjecture proposed in [26], it can be proved that the algebraic immunity of our functions is at least suboptimal. Moreover,
when k is odd, the algebraic immunity is actually optimal, and for even k, we find that the algebraic immunity is optimal at
least for k ≤ 29. We believe that this class of functions are of both theoretical and practical importance.
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